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Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets
Moshe Babaioff∗, Noam Nisan†, Inbal Talgam-Cohen‡
Abstract
Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) is a classic solution to the problem of fair and
efficient allocation of goods [Foley’67, Varian’74]. Every agent receives an equal budget of artificial
currency with which to purchase goods, and prices match demand and supply. However, a CEEI is not
guaranteed to exist when the goods are indivisible, even in the simple two-agent, single-item market.
Yet, it is easy to see that once the two budgets are slightly perturbed (made generic), a competitive
equilibrium does exist.
In this paper we aim to extend this approach beyond the single-item case, and study the existence
of equilibria in markets with two agents and additive preferences over multiple items. We show that
for agents with equal budgets, making the budgets generic – by adding vanishingly small random
perturbations – ensures the existence of an equilibrium. We further consider agents with arbitrary non-
equal budgets, representing non-equal entitlements for goods. We show that competitive equilibrium
guarantees a new notion of fairness among non-equal agents, and that it exists in cases of interest (like
when the agents have identical preferences) if budgets are perturbed. Our results open opportunities
for future research on generic equilibrium existence and fair treatment of non-equals.
1 Introduction.
We study fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods in settings in which utility is non-transferable
(without money). Such settings arise in many real-life allocation scenarios, such as allocating donated
food items to food banks [53], assigning courses to students or shifts to workers [18], or sharing scien-
tific/computational resources within a university or company. Our motivation is two-fold: First, we wish
to identify conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium despite the goods’ indivisibility. Sec-
ond, we wish to develop notions of fairness that apply to the allocation of such goods among agents with
different entitlements; we approach fairness through the prism of competitive equilibrium – a connection
made long ago by [32, 63].
1.1 Competitive equilibrium in Fisher markets with indivisible goods.
A fundamental achievement of general equilibrium theory is to establish conditions under which a com-
petitive equilibrium exists in markets of divisible items [4, 30, 43, Chapters 15–20]). The theory does not
extend to indivisible items. In this paper we focus on a simple Fisher market model [11], where there are
m goods and 2 agents with positive budgets b1, b2 of artificial currency, and each agent has an additive
preference over the goods. Unfortunately, even in the simplest markets of this structure, when there is a
single indivisible item and two agents with the same budget (m = 1 and b1 = b2 = 1/2), no competitive
equilibrium exists. This is so since if the item’s price is at most 1/2 then both agents demand it, while if
its price is above 1/2 then neither agent can afford it and the market does not clear.1
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1Since the currency is artificial and money has no intrinsic value, an agent is not satisfied if the price is exactly her budget
but she doesn’t get the item.
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The non-existence of a competitive equilibrium in the above simple example is a knife-edge phe-
nomenon: if the budgets were 1/2 +  and 1/2, instead of being exactly equal, then an equilibrium would
exist (e.g., by setting the item price at 1/2 + .) To avoid knife-edge non-existence, Budish [18] initiated
the study of competitive equilibrium with almost-equal budgets. He showed existence results for an ap-
proximate such equilibrium notion, in which the demand and supply are only approximately matched by
the prices. In this paper we take the idea of almost-equal budgets a step further. We study competitive
equilibrium with generic budgets – arbitrary budgets (possibly far from equal) that are slightly perturbed.
Unlike Budish, we focus on monotone and in particular additive preferences and thus are able to avoid
approximate equilibrium notions.
Our main conceptual contribution is pointing out that making the budgets generic significantly ex-
pands the set of markets in which competitive equilibria exist. In this paper we demonstrate the promise
of our approach of perturbing the budgets (making them generic) for obtaining provable existence guar-
antees in several settings of interest, including the case of two agents with equal budgets (which are
perturbed to become generic) or different budgets but the same additive preferences. Moreover, evidence
gathered from computer simulations (and a small amount of real-life data – see Appendix B) suggests
that generic equilibrium existence may be quite common in practical settings. This motivates the study
of competitive equilibrium from generic budgets as a solution concept for indivisible items. Nevertheless,
we note that generic budgets are not a silver bullet solution to competitive equilibrium non-existence
in every market, as we show in our companion paper [7] for agents with non-additive preferences.2 We
note that once equal budgets are perturbed, or when agents have non-equal entitlements for the goods
(represented by non-equal budgets) standard notions of fairness (like proportional share) are no longer
appropriate. We thus turn next to discuss fairness properties with non-equal entitlements.
1.2 Fairness with indivisible goods and different entitlements.
Which allocations of goods among agents should be considered “fair”? A vast literature is devoted to
this question (for expositions see, e.g., [12, 14, Chapters 11–13]). Many standard notions of fairness
in the literature reflect an underlying assumption that all agents have an equally-strong claim to the
goods. However, some agents may be a priori much more entitled to the goods than others (see, e.g. [56,
Chapters 3 and 11]). Real-life examples include – in addition to the ones mentioned above – partners
who own different shares of the partnership’s holdings [24], different departments sharing a company’s
computational resources [35], or family members splitting an heirloom [52]. Our model captures these
situations, since the entitlement of agent i can be encoded by his budget bi (we may assume without loss
of generality that
∑
i bi = 1).
An appropriate notion of fairness should of course take into account the indivisible goods and different
entitlements, and capture the idea of “proportional satisfaction of claims” [17, p. 95]. In the special case
where all entitlements are equal (b1 = ... = bn = 1/n), envy-freeness (no agent prefers another’s allocation
to his own) is an important fairness criterion [32], but it is not clear how to generalize this notion to
heterogeneous entitlements. Fair share (every agent i prefers his allocation to a bi-fraction of all items,
when divisible) is also an important fairness criterion [60], but it does not easily extend to indivisible
items.
In this paper we adapt a well-known approach to fair allocation with equal entitlements – finding a
competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI ) [63, 8] – to the case of unequal entitlements. We
may treat the agents as buyers and their entitlements as budgets, and seek a competitive equilibrium in
the resulting Fisher market. Such an equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist, but this is to be expected
– indivisibility can indeed undermine the ability to fairly allocate. Our idea is to first perturb the
entitlements (budgets), and aim to show that competitive equilibrium from such generic incomes exists
more widely and offers approximate fairness guarantees that are the best possible given indivisibilities.
2In particular, for 2 agents and 5 items, when the agents’ preferences are monotone yet non-additive, generic budgets are
not sufficient to guarantee existence of competitive equilibria.
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Thus, a better understanding of competitive equilibrium with generic budgets can help reach fair division
of indivisible items among agents with heterogeneous entitlements.
1.3 Our results.
In this paper we focus on markets in which agents have additive preferences. This is a natural starting
point for research on generic budgets, which already raises rich technical challenges and requires novel
techniques. Additive preferences have been the main focus of recent research on fair allocation of indi-
visible goods [8]. Moreover, we focus on the case of 2 agents, which is a natural starting point and is
probably the most important in practice (e.g., the fair-division website Fair Outcomes Inc. is dedicated
to 2 agents, implementing the 2-agent adjusted winner protocol [12]). See [50, Section 1.1.1] for more on
the importance of the 2-agent setting.
As we saw, for two agents with the same budgets and a single item, a competitive equilibrium (CE) fails
to exist. In that example, each agents’ proportional share of the item is half the item, yet one necessarily
is getting nothing. We first prove that in any case that there is a way to avoid this unfair situation, a
CE indeed exists, and this is true even when budgets are not equal. Define the budget-proportional share
of agent i to be any set of items that that gives the agent at least bi/(b1 + b2) of her value for the set M
(her total value). We prove that if there is an allocation that concurrently gives each of the two agents
her budget-proportional share, then a CE exists. In the single item case and agents with equal budgets,
clearly there is no allocation that gives both agents their proportional share. We thus proceed to our main
contribution – using budget perturbations and by that moving to generic budgets – as a tool to obtain
existence of equilibrium even when there is no allocation that gives the agents their budget-proportional
shares, and this is obtained even when there are multiple items.
1.3.1 Main existence result: Generic budgets circumvent CEEI nonexistence.
Our main result is that for two additive agents, even with multiple items, generic budgets can serve as a
form of tie-breaking to solve the CEEI nonexistence issue in our setting:
Theorem 1.1 (Existence for almost equal budgets) Consider 2 agents with additive preferences over
multiple items. If the budgets are sufficiently close to being equal, but not precisely so, then a CE exists.
As we have seen, for a single item any such Ce cannot give both agents their proportional share. Yet,
our proof shows that the CE that is guaranteed to exist by Theorem 1.1, gives each agent her truncated
share. The truncated share is defined by her share at the agent’s most preferred Pareto efficient allocation,
assuming she is doomed to get less than her proportional share.
We leave open the problem of extending the theorem to more than 2 agents.
Open Problem 1 Consider n > 2 agents with additive preferences over multiple items. Does there exist
a CE when budgets are sufficiently close to being equal?
1.3.2 Main fairness result for competitive equilibria.
For agents with equal budgets, it is known that when a CE exists, its allocation has a natural fairness
property related to the well-known cut-and-choose protocol. In this protocol one agent (the “cutter”)
divides the items into 2 sets, and the other agent chooses her favorite set. Each agent gets a bundle she
prefers at least as much as the one she can guarantee for herself as the cutter – this is called her maximin
share (MMS).
When budgets are perturbed, they are no longer equal. Thus we would like to understand the fairness
properties guaranteed when budgets are not equal. How can the above protocol be adapted to different
budgets? We next suggest a generalization of MMS to the case of different budgets:
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An `-out-of-d maximin share of an agent is any bundle at least as preferred as the one she can
guarantee by the following (hypothetical) protocol: the agent partitions the items into d parts (some may
be empty), and then takes the worst ` of these parts (since the other agents are entitled to d − ` of the
parts, and their choice may as well be the worst possible for the cutter).
Theorem 1.2 (Fairness) Consider n agents with general preferences. In any CE allocation, for every
agent i ∈ [n] and rational number `/d ≤ bi, agent i gets her `-out-of-d maximin share.
1.3.3 Additional results.
Theorem 1.1 is based on a characterization we develop for CEs with 2 agents and arbitrary budgets,
which has a particularly nice form for additive preferences. From the characterization it follows that
linear combinations of the agents’ preferences form equilibrium prices under a certain condition (“budget
exhaustion”). We use a graphical representation of allocations and their values (depicted in Figures 1-6)
to identify allocations and value combinations for which the condition holds, and CE existence follows.
We use the machinery we have built to prove some additional interesting results for markets with two
additive agents, presented below.
Second welfare theorem. The characterization we develop for CEs with 2 agents is also useful in
establishing the second welfare theorem in our setting. Despite the fundamental nature of the theorem
and setting, to the best of our knowledge this was not previously observed. The theorem states that for
any valuations, any Pareto efficient allocation for these valuations is an allocation of some CE, for some
appropriately set budgets.
Theorem 1.3 (Second welfare theorem) Consider 2 agents with additive preferences. For every
Pareto efficient allocation S = (S1,S2), there exist budgets b1, b2 and prices p such that (S, p) is a CE.
Competitive equilibrium with non-equal budgets. The same machinery that establishes existence for
almost equal budgets applies to agents with very different budgets, to which the solution concept of CE
with generic budgets immediately extends. We focus on the case in which the agents have the same
preferences, putting them in the most direct competition over the goods, and for this case we show:
Theorem 1.4 (Generic existence for identical preferences, different budgets) Consider 2 agents
with identical additive preferences over the goods and arbitrary budgets. If their budgets are generic then
a CE exists.
1.4 Organization.
Section 2 introduces the model and preliminaries. Section 3 addresses the fairness properties of CEs
(formally states and proves Theorem 1.2). Section 4 begins to build the tools we will need for our
existence results, by characterizing CEs with 2 agents (and deriving Theorem 1.3 as a consequence).
Section 5 shows that if both agents can receive their budget-proportional share then a CE exists. The
required machinery for existence with generic budgets is set up in Section 6. Our main result (Theorem
1.1) follows, and is formally stated and proved in Section 7. Section 8 includes the result for different
budgets (Theorem 1.4). Section 9 contains a discussion and conclusions.
1.5 Additional related work.
Discrete Fisher markets. Our model is a special case of Arrow-Debreu exchange economies with
indivisible items. Several other variants have been studied: [61, 44, 1, 33, 47] consider markets with
indivisibilities in which an infinitely divisible good plays the role of money, and so money carries inherent
value for the agents. Shapley and Scarf [58], Svensson [62] and subsequent works focus on the house
allocation problem with unit-demand agents. Several works assume a continuum of agents [e.g., 42],
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and/or study relaxed CE notions [e.g., 28, 26, 55]. Closest are the models of combinatorial assignment
[18], which allows non-monotonic preferences, and of linear markets [26], which crucially relies on non-
generic budgets.
CEEI. Budish [18] circumvents the non-existence of CEEI due to indivisibilities by weakening the
equilibrium concept and allowing market clearance to hold only approximately. He focuses exclusively
on budgets that are almost equal. In the same model, Othman et al. [49] show PPAD-completeness
of computing an approximate CEEI, and NP-completeness of deciding the existence of an approximate
CEEI with better approximation factors than those shown to exist by Budish. The preferences used
in the hardness proofs are non-monotone, leading Othman et al. to suggest the research direction of
restricting the preferences (as we do here) as a way around their negative results. Braˆnzei et al. [15] study
(exact) CEEI existence for two valuation classes (perfect substitutes and complements) with non-generic
budgets. For divisible items, there has been renewed interest in CEEI under additive preferences due to
their succinctness and practicality. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8] offer a characterization based on natural
axioms, and Bogomolnaia et al. [9] analyze CEEI allocations of “bads” rather than goods.
Fairness with indivisibilities. Most notions of fair allocation in the classic literature apply to divisible
items. Bouveret et al. [10] survey research on fairness with indivisible items, emphasizing computational
challenges (see also [25, 5]). The works of [40, 41] study envy minimization (rather than elimination)
with indivisibilities. Guruswami et al. [38] study envy-freeness in the context of profit-maximizing pric-
ing. Several recent works [22, 20, 16, 23, 3, 34] consider the approximation of Nash social welfare and
related fairness guarantees. As for practical implementations of fair division with indivisibilities, these
are discussed by Budish and Cantillon [19] (for responsive preferences), Othman et al. [48] (implementing
findings of Budish [18]), Goldman and Procaccia [36] (presenting the Spliddit website for additive pref-
erences), and Brams and Taylor [12] (presenting the adjusted winner algorithm in which one item may
need to be divided). Mechanism design aspects appear in [2]. For further discussion see Section 2.3.
Concurrent and subsequent work. Several additional results related to CEs with generic budgets
appear in our companion paper [7], which studies preferences that are not necessarily additive. The paper
considers the case of general monotone preferences and maps the limits of this approach for different
numbers of items. It then considers cardinal preferences over many items and defines a hierarchy of
preference classes, establishes relations between them and proves results about existence of equilibria
with generic budgets for some of these classes.
In a follow-up paper to our work, [57] has shown that for four agents with arbitrary budgets, non-
existence persists even with generic budgets. Yet, that result does not rule out that for more than 2
agents, equilibrium exists for generic budgets that are almost equal.
Recently there has been increasing interest in fair division of indivisible goods; the following works
appeared concurrently or subsequently to early versions of our paper:
Farhadi et al. [31] independently develop a new fairness notion for allocation among agents with
cardinal preferences and different entitlements. Their notion is distinct from ours and is not directly
related to the solution concept of a CE. For example, their fairness notion is not always guaranteed
when allocating 3 items among agents with generic budgets (as implied in their Theorem 2.1). This is at
odds with our CE existence results and resulting fairness guarantees according to our notions of fairness
(Proposition 3.2 and companion paper), demonstrating the difference between the approaches.
Several recent papers have advanced our understanding of envy-freeness, including [51] which studies
the envy-free relaxation EF-1* suggested by [20], and the works of [6] and [21] which study envy-freeness
with incomplete knowledge.
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2 Model.
In this section we formulate our market model and competitive equilibrium notion (with generic budgets),
and present fairness preliminaries.
Throughout we use the notation [d] where d is a positive integer to denote the set {1, . . . , d}.
2.1 Market setting.
We study discrete Fisher markets which consist of a set M of m indivisible items and a set N of n agents.
We refer to subsets of items as bundles and often denote them by S or T . Each agent i ∈ N has a
cardinal preference, represented by a valuation function vi : 2
M → R≥0 which assigns to every bundle S a
nonnegative value vi(S). Agent i prefers bundle S to bundle T iff vi(S) > vi(T ), and cardinality allows us
to compare by how much – by considering the ratio vi(S)/vi(T ). The absolute values themselves however
don’t matter, hence a cardinal valuation can be normalized without loss of generality (wlog).
Our results hold primarily for the class of additive preferences. A cardinal preference vi is additive if
vi(S) =
∑
j∈S vi({j}) for every bundle S. We assume wlog that vi is normalized, i.e.,
vi(M) = 1.
We also assume that preferences are monotone (satisfy free disposal), i.e., vi(S) < vi(T ) whenever S ⊂ T .
Moreover we assume strict preferences (no indifferences), i.e., either vi(S) < vi(T ) or vi(S) > vi(T )
whenever S 6= T . We allow one exception to strictness – items may be identical, in which case preferences
over them are allowed to be weakly-monotone rather than strictly so, reflecting that identical items are
interchangeable.3
In addition to preferences, agents in our model have budgets. Let b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn) be a budget
profile, where bi > 0 is agent i’s budget. Unless stated otherwise, we assume wlog that
n∑
i=1
bi = 1,
and b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bn (every market can be converted to satisfy these properties by renaming and
normalization).
We emphasize that budgets and “money” in our model are only means for allocating items among
agents with different entitlements. Money has no intrinsic value for the agents, whose preferences are
over subsets of items and who disregard any leftover budget. For this reason, it is important that the
preferences are scale-free, in contrast to a model with money where a value vi,j can be interpreted as the
amount agent i is willing to pay for item j. Similarly, scale-dependent measures of social efficiency and
fairness like welfare and minimum-value are inappropriate in our model.
2.2 Competitive equilibrium (CE).
The goal of the market is to allocate the items among the agents. An allocation S = (S1,S2, . . . ,Sn) is
a partition of all items among the agents, i.e., Si ∩ Sk = ∅ for i 6= k and
⋃
i Si = M . By definition, an
allocation is feasible (no item is allocated more than once) and market clearing (every item is allocated).
A competitive equilibrium is an allocation together with item prices that “stabilize” it. Let p =
(p1, p2, . . . , pm) denote a vector of non-negative item prices. The price p(S) of a bundle S is then
∑
j∈S pj .
We say that S is within budget bi if p(S) ≤ bi, and that it is demanded by agent i at price vector p if it
is the most preferred bundle within her budget at these prices. Formally, p(Si) ≤ bi, and p(T ) > bi for
every T such that v(T ) > v(Si). We can now define our equilibrium notion:
3No agent wants multiple copies of the same item. All the CEs in our existence results assign the same prices to identical
items. This is similar to the treatment of identical items in [18], where prices are assigned to classes rather than to individual
seats.
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Definition 2.1 (CE) A competitive equilibrium (CE) is a pair (S, p) of allocation S and item prices p,
such that Si is demanded by agent i at prices p for every i ∈ N .
Given a market with preferences {vi}i∈N and budget profile b, an allocation S is supported in a CE
if there exist item prices p such that (S, p) is a CE. Where only preferences are given, we overload this
notion and say that S is supported in a CE if there exist prices p and budgets b such that (S, p) is a CE.
Given budgets b and an allocation S, we say that prices p are budget-exhausting if p(Si) = bi for
every agent i. Note that if p is budget-exhausting then every agent is allocated, i.e., Si 6= ∅ for every i
(since bi > 0). We observe that budget-exhaustion is wlog when every agent is allocated, and use this
observation throughout the paper.
Claim 2.2 (Budget-exhausting prices are wlog) For every CE (S, p) such that Si 6= ∅ for every
i ∈ N , there exists a CE (S, p′) in which p′ is budget-exhausting.
Proof: Proof. As every agent is allocated at least one item, we can raise the price of that item in his
allocated bundle until her budget is exhausted. The new prices form a CE with the original allocation
since every agent still gets her demanded set.
2.2.1 Pareto optimality (PO).
What does it means for an allocation (CE or otherwise) to be “efficient”?
Definition 2.3 (PO) Consider a market with preferences {vi}i∈N . An allocation S is Pareto optimal
(PO) (a.k.a. Pareto efficient) if no allocation S ′ dominates S, i.e., if for every S ′ 6= S there exists an
agent i for whom vi(Si) > vi(S ′i).
We use the notation P˜O = P˜O(v1, v2) to denote the set of all different PO allocations for preferences
v1, v2.
There are two kinds of fundamental welfare theorems in economics that apply to various market
equilibrium notions. The first is about Pareto optimality and holds for CEs in our setting; we discuss the
second in Section 4.
Theorem 2.4 (First welfare theorem) Let (S, p) be a CE. Then S is PO.
Proof: Proof (for completeness). Assume for contradiction an alternative allocation S ′, such that for
every agent i for whom Si 6= S ′i it holds that vi(Si) < vi(S ′i). Consider the total payment
∑
i p(S ′i) for the
alternative allocation given the CE prices p. By market clearance,
∑
i p(S ′i) =
∑
i p(Si). Therefore there
must exist an agent i for whom Si 6= S ′i but p(S ′i) ≤ p(Si). This means that Si cannot be demanded by
agent i, leading to a contradiction.
2.2.2 Generic budgets (vs. different budgets).
We are interested in showing generic existence of a CE for classes of markets. We use the standard notion
of genericity, i.e., “all except for a zero-measure”, or equivalently, “with tiny random perturbations”. By
generic existence we thus mean that for every market in the class, for every vector of budgets except for
a zero-measure subset, a CE exists. An equivalent way to say this is: for every market in the class, for
every vector of budgets, by adding tiny random perturbations to the budgets we get a new instance in
which a CE exists with probability 1.
A useful way of specifying a zero-measure subset of budgets is as those which satisfy some condition, for
instance, b1 = 2b2. The conditions we use differ among different CE existence results, and for concreteness
we shall list them explicitly within each result; we emphasize however that the conditions themselves are
irrelevant to our contribution, as long as the measure of budgets satisfying them is zero.
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Generic budgets are not to be confused with different (or arbitrary) budgets, by which we mean budgets
that are not necessarily equal or almost equal to one another. While fair allocation among (almost) equal
agents is well-studied, much less is known for agents who have a priori different entitlements, as modeled
by different budgets.
2.3 Fairness preliminaries.
We include here the fairness preliminaries most related to our results; a more detailed account – including
ordinal preferences in addition to cardinal ones, envy-freeness in addition to fair share, and Nash social
welfare – appears in Appendix 2.3 and is summarized in Tables 1-2. These tables also show where our
new fairness notions fit in with existing ones.
The “two most important tests of equity” according to Moulin [45, p.166] are (i) guaranteeing each
agent his fair share (FS); and (ii) envy-freeness (EF). Our main concern is FS, “probably the least
controversial fairness requirement in the literature” [9] – in the setting of indivisible items and agents
with different budgets for which not much is known. Intuitively, FS for divisible items and equal-budget
agents guarantees that each agent believes she receives at least 1/n of the divisible “cake” (while EF
guarantees she believes no one else receives a better slice than hers). More formally, FS requires for each
agent to receive a bundle that she prefers at least as much as the bundle consisting of a 1/n-fraction of
every divisible item on the market.
When items are indivisible, to define FS we must use the cardinal nature of the preferences in our
model. The parallel of FS is the notion of proportionality, which extends naturally to agents with different
budgets: Given a budget profile b, an allocation S gives agent i his budget-proportional share if agent
i receives at least a bi-fraction of his value for all items, that is vi(Si) ≥ bi · vi(M). An allocation is
budget-proportional (a.k.a. weighted-proportional) if every agent receives his proportional share. When
all budgets are equal, such an allocation is simply called proportional.
Unfortunately, budget-proportionality is a very restrictive fairness requirement when dealing with
indivisible items (see Section 5). Budish [18] studies the following weaker notion:
Definition 2.5 (FS with indivisibilities) An allocation S guarantees 1-out-of-n maximin share if ev-
ery agent receives a bundle she prefers at least as much as the bundle she can guarantee for herself by
the following procedure: partitioning the items into n parts, and allowing the n− 1 other agents to chose
their parts first (assuming their choice is the worst possible for her).
Every CE for n agents with equal budgets gives every agent his 1-out-of-n maximin share and achieves
EF. An allocation that gives every agent his 1-out-of-n maximin share does not always exist beyond 2
agents [39]. Budish [18] shows that every CE for n agents with almost equal budgets guarantees 1-out-
of-(n+ 1) maximin share (as if there were an extra agent to share with). In Proposition 3.2 we generalize
this result to different budgets, by defining the fairness notion of `-out-of-d maximin share.
3 Fairness Properties of CE.
Fairness properties that apply when agents have equal entitlements are no longer appropriate even when
agents have almost-equal budgets. Indeed, when there is only 1 item, one of the agents is allocated
nothing and thus does not get his proportional share. Thus we are interested in fairness properties that
are guaranteed by the existence of a CE when agents have non-equal budgets (possibly even far from
being equal). In a sense, we are building upon the classic connection between CE with equal budgets and
fairness, expanding it to different budgets, and using it to derive a natural fairness notion appropriate for
a priori non-equal agents.
In Section 3.1 we define our notion (Def. 3.1): a parameterized version of the 1-out-of-n maximin
share guarantee (Def. 2.5), generalizing it to accommodate arbitrary (possibly very different) budgets. In
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Section 3.2 we show that every CE guarantees fairness according to our notion (Proposition 3.2), and in
Section 3.3 we briefly discuss implications. (We remark that in subsequent sections we discuss a different
fairness notion – truncated share – which is guaranteed by all of our CE existence results but not by every
CE in general.)
3.1 Definition of `-out-of-d maximin share.
Consider an agent i. Her `-out-of-d maximin bundle is the bundle she can guarantee for herself by the
following (hypothetical) protocol: the agent partitions the items into d parts, lets the other agents choose
d− ` of these parts (their choice is assumed to be worst-case), then receives the remaining ` parts.
Example 3.1 The 2-out-of-3 maximin bundle of an additive agent who values items (A,B,C) at (1, 2, 3)
is {A,B}.
Agent i’s `-out-of-d maximin share reflects how preferable her `-out-of-d maximin bundle is for her.
We now give a formal definition:
Definition 3.1 An allocation S guarantees agent i her `-out-of-d maximin share if
vi(Si) ≥ max
partition (T1,...,Td)
{
min
L⊆[d],|L|=`
{
vi
(⋃
t∈L
Tt
)}}
.
3.2 `-out-of-d maximin share in equilibrium.
The following proposition holds generally for any market setting (for any number of agents, preference
class, etc.), and shows that a CE guarantees for every agent her fair share in the sense of Definition 3.1.
The parameters ` and d in the `-out-of-d maximin share guarantee correspond to the budget bi of the
agent, thus mirroring her a priori entitlement to the items.
Proposition 3.2 Let b be an arbitrary budget profile. Every CE guarantees agent i her `-out-of-d max-
imin share for every rational number `/d ≤ bi.
Proof: Proof.Let (S, p) be a CE and let P denote the sum of prices
∑
j∈M pj . Since S is an allocation of
all items, every item is “purchased” by an agent and so P =
∑
j pj ≤
∑
i bi = 1. Let (T1, . . . , Td) be any
partition of the items into d parts, and observe that 1 ≥ P = ∑j pj = p(⋃dt=1 Tt) = ∑dt=1 p(Tt) (using
linearity of the prices). By the pigeonhole principle, there exists a subset of ` parts whose total price is at
most `dP ≤ `d . Let us call this “the cheap subset”. By the proposition’s assumption, `d ≤ bi. Therefore,
agent i can afford the cheap subset, and by definition of a CE the bundle actually allocated to agent i
must be at least as preferred by him as the cheap subset.
3.3 Discussion of `-out-of-d maximin share.
For the case of almost equal budgets, Proposition 3.2 subsumes the celebrated result of Budish [18] that
every CE with almost equal budgets gives every agent her 1-out-of-(n + 1) maximin share. To see this
notice that if budgets are almost equal then b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn ≥ nn+1b1 ≥ 1n+1 for every agent i (the last
inequality follows since b1 must be ≥ 1/n for the budgets to sum up to 1). Thus the result of Budish can
be deduced from Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2 also strengthens the result of Budish in the following sense. Consider n = 2 a priori
equal agents and m = 5 items. The 1-out-of-(n+ 1) maximin share in this case guarantees the worst part
out of a partition of the 5 items into 3 parts; the `-out-of-d maximin share applies with ` = 2, d = 5 (since
`/d = 2/5  1/2), guaranteeing the worst 2 parts out of a partition of the 5 items into 5 parts. If an
agent views the items as roughly equal, the latter guarantee is strictly better (2 items rather than 1).
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The flexibility allowed by the parameters ` and d is even more important when dealing with different
(i.e. not almost equal) budgets. Consider m = 3 items and an agent with budget 5/13. Dividing the 3
items into 13 parts and taking the worst 5 parts does not guarantee the agent anything beyond an empty
bundle, whereas taking the worst part among 3 (using that 1/3 ≤ 5/13) guarantees her at least one item.
4 CE Characterization and Second Welfare Theorem.
In this section we state and prove a sufficient condition for CE existence (Lemma 4.3), which is the
workhorse of our existence results in subsequent sections. We demonstrate its usefulness by deriving from
it the second welfare theorem (Theorem 4.4).
4.1 Characterization.
We begin by presenting necessary and sufficient conditions for a budget-exhausting pricing and PO allo-
cation to form a CE, when each of the n = 2 agents gets a non-empty set (in this case budget-exhaustion
is wlog by Claim 2.2). The characterization holds beyond additive preferences for any pair of cardinal
preferences. To state it we use the following standard notation: for a preference vi and disjoint sets S, T ,
the marginal value of S given T is denoted by vi(S | T ) = vi(S ∪ T )− vi(T ).
Proposition 4.1 (Characterization) Given 2 agents with monotone cardinal preferences v1, v2, con-
sider a PO allocation S = (S1,S2) in which Si 6= ∅ for i ∈ {1, 2}, and budget-exhausting item prices p.
Then (S, p) forms a CE if and only if for i, k ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= k, and for every two bundles S ⊆ Si, T ⊆ Sk,
vi(S | Si \ S) > vi(T | Si \ S) and vk(S | Sk \ T ) > vk(T | Sk \ T ) =⇒ p(S) > p(T ). (1)
Proof: Proof. For the first direction, assume by way of contradiction that (S, p) is a CE but Condition (1)
is violated. Wlog assume that this is the case for S ⊆ S1 and T ⊆ S2, i.e., it holds that v1(S | S1 \ S) >
v1(T | S1 \S) and v2(S | S2 \T ) > v2(T | S2 \T ) while p(S) ≤ p(T ). Then agent 2 prefers to swap T for
S and has enough budget to do so, in contradiction to the fact that he gets his demanded set in the CE.
For the other direction, consider a pair (S, p) such that Condition (1) holds for every S, T as in the
proposition statement. Assume by way of contradiction that (wlog) agent 2 is not allocated his demanded
set. Then since agent 2’s budget is exhausted, this means there must be bundles S ⊆ S1 and T ⊆ S2 such
that v2(S | S2 \ T ) > v2(T | S2 \ T ) and p(S) ≤ p(T ). Therefore, v1(S | S1 \ S) ≤ v1(T | S1 \ S), and so
by swapping S, T in the allocation we arrive at a new allocation strictly preferred agent 2, and no worse
for agent 1, in contradiction to the Pareto optimality of S.
4.2 Sufficient condition for equilibrium existence.
When preferences are additive, prices can be derived from weighted linear combinations of the preferences:
Definition 4.2 Consider 2 additive preferences v1, v2, and parameters α, β ∈ <+ such that max{α, β} >
0. The combination pricing p with parameters α, β is an item pricing that assigns every item j the price
pj = αv1({j}) + βv2({j}).
Observe that by additivity of v1, v2 in Definition 4.2, the combination pricing p with parameters α, β
assigns every bundle S the price p(S) = αv1(S) + βv2(S). Note that identical items have identical prices
(items j, j′ are identical precisely if vi({j}) = vi({j′}) for every agent i).
The following lemma presents a sufficient condition for CE existence, and is the workhorse of our
existence results in this paper:
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Lemma 4.3 (Budget-exhausting combination pricing is sufficient) Consider 2 agents with addi-
tive preferences and budgets b1 ≥ b2 > 0 (possibly equal). If for a PO allocation S there exists a budget-
exhausting combination pricing p, then (S, p) is a CE.
Proof: Proof. The existence of a budget-exhausting pricing indicates that both agents are allocated
nonempty bundles in S. Thus by Proposition 4.1, to prove the lemma it is sufficient to show that
Condition (1) holds. For additive preferences this condition can be written as: for every i, k ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= k,
and for every two bundles S ⊆ Si, T ⊆ Sk,
vi(S) > vi(T ) and vk(S) > vk(T ) =⇒ p(S) > p(T ).
Plugging in the combination pricing, for every S, T such that v1(S) > v1(T ) and v2(S) > v2(T ), it holds
that p(S) = αv1(S) + βv2(S) > αv1(T ) + βv2(T ) = p(T ). So Condition (1) holds for any i 6= k ∈ {1, 2},
and (S, p) is a CE.
4.3 Second welfare theorem.
A second fundamental theorem of welfare economics is of the form [43, Part III, p. 308]:
“[A]ny Pareto optimal outcome can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium if appropriate
lump-sum transfers of wealth are arranged.”
In particular, this means that any socially-efficient allocation that a social planner deems desirable for its
equitability can be realized in equilibrium. In our context, such a theorem would say that for every set
of agents and their preferences, for every PO allocation S of items among them, we can find budgets for
the agents and prices for the items which support S as a CE. From the companion paper we know that
such a theorem does not hold for 2 agents with general preferences. We use Lemma 4.3 to establish the
second welfare theorem for two agents with additive preferences:
Theorem 4.4 (Second welfare theorem) Consider 2 agents with additive preferences. For every PO
allocation S, there exist budgets b1, b2 and prices p for which (S, p) is a CE.
Moreover, if both agents are allocated non-empty bundles in S, then (S, p) is a CE for any combination
pricing p and corresponding budgets b1 = p(S1), b2 = p(S2).
Proof: Proof. If S allocates all items to a single agent, wlog agent 1, then we can get a CE by pricing
every item at some arbitrary price ρ > 0, setting b1 = mρ, and setting b2 < ρ (the budgets can of
course be normalized). Otherwise, fix any combination pricing p; in particular, a combination pricing
with parameters α = β = 1. Set bi = p(Si) for every agent i. By Lemma 4.3, (S, p) is a CE, completing
the proof.
5 Budget-Proportionality.
Section 5.1 shows that if we are fortunate enough to face a setting in which a budget-proportional allocation
exists despite item indivisibility, then a CE is also guaranteed to exist (Theorem 5.2). This existence result
does not rely on generic budgets. Section 5.2 deals with the case of no budget-proportional allocation,
identifying two alternative candidates for CE allocations which are as close to budget-proportional as
possible. These are the basis for the existence results in Sections 6-8.
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5.1 Equilibrium existence when a budget-proportional allocation exists.
Since preferences are normalized, agent i gets his budget-proportional share precisely when vi(Si) ≥ bi.
We say that agent i gets at most his budget-proportional share if vi(Si) ≤ bi, and call an allocation
anti-proportional if every agent gets at most his budget-proportional share and at least one agent gets
strictly below it (Claim A.2 in Appendix A demonstrates the existence of markets in which the allocation
of every CE is anti-proportional.)
We show that every budget-proportional PO allocation is supported in a CE. By the same argu-
ment, anti-proportional PO allocations are also supported in a CE. The proof is by exploiting (anti-
)proportionality to construct a budget-exhausting combination pricing.
Proposition 5.1 For 2 agents with additive preferences and any budgets, every budget-proportional PO
allocation is supported in a CE. Additionally, every anti-proportional PO allocation is supported in a CE.
Proof: Proof. Let v1, v2 be the preferences and b1, b2 the budgets (all normalized), and let S = (S1,S2)
be a budget-proportional PO allocation.
Since v1(S1) ≥ b1, v2(S2) ≥ b2 and by normalization, we have that v1(S2) = 1− v1(S1) ≤ 1− b1 = b2
and v2(S1) = 1− v2(S2) ≤ 1− b2 = b1.
We now construct a budget-exhausting combination pricing with parameters α, β. If it is the case
that v1(S1) + v2(S2) = 1 (and thus b1 = v1(S1) and b2 = v2(S2)), we set α = 1 and β = 0. Otherwise,
v1(S1) + v2(S2)− 1 6= 0, and we can set
α =
v2(S2)− b2
v1(S1) + v2(S2)− 1 , β = 1− α =
v1(S1)− b1
v1(S1) + v2(S2)− 1 . (2)
Observe that
αv1(S1) + βv2(S1) = v2(S2)− b2
v1(S1) + v2(S2)− 1v1(S1) +
v1(S1)− b1
v1(S1) + v2(S2)− 1(1− v2(S2)) = b1,
and that similarly αv1(S2) + βv2(S2) = b2. Since the allocation is budget-proportional, it holds that
α, β ≥ 0. In each of the two cases we thus have a combination pricing p with parameters α, β such that
p(S1) = b1 and p(S2) = b2, and thus by Lemma 4.3, (S, p) is a CE.
It remains to consider anti-proportional PO allocations. For every such allocation in which one agent
gets at most his budget-proportional share and the other gets less then his share, the same pair of
parameters α, β defined in Equation (2) will give a budget-exhausting combination pricing with non-
negative parameters, and thus a CE.
Observe that every budget-proportional allocation is dominated by a budget-proportional PO alloca-
tion. The following theorem thus follows directly from Proposition 5.1.
Theorem 5.2 If there exists a budget-proportional allocation then a CE exists.
5.2 As close as possible to budget-proportionality.
Let us assume from now on that a budget-proportional allocation does not exist (and nor does an anti-
proportional PO allocation). When it is not possible to simultaneously give each agent her budget-
proportional share, the next best thing in terms of fairness is her “truncated” share: the best she can
obtain in any PO allocation in which she is allocated at most her budget-proportional share. In this
section we formalize this notion, and show two PO allocations that give both agents their truncated
shares. Both of these are natural candidates for CEs, and we indeed validate this intuition in Sections
6-8. Thus, all of our positive results establish the existence of CEs for allocations that are “as fair as
possible”. In Example 5.1 we show that not every CE has this property.
Figure 1 depicts the setting and fixes our notation.
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Figure 1: This figure illustrates the setting and notation when neither a budget-proportional nor an
anti-proportional PO allocation exists. It shows the value of an allocation for agent 1 on the v1-axis and
the value of an allocation for agent 2 on the v2-axis. Every allocation S can be represented by the point
(v1(S1), v2(S2)) on the (v1 × v2)-plane. The two points A,B ∈ P˜O represent two PO allocations. The
agents’ budgets b1, b2 are shown on the same axes.
The closure of the solid blue area (at or to the right of b1 and at or above b2) includes all allocations
that are budget-proportional, and is empty by assumption. The closure of the red dotted area (at or to
the left of b1 and at or below b2) represents anti-proportional allocations and has no PO allocations by
assumption. By Pareto optimality, the blue striped areas (to the right and above A and B) are both
empty – the only allocation in their closures are A and B. The figure also depicts rectangles T1, T2, X, Y ,
and Z, which will play a role in our arguments in Sections 6-8.
Definition 5.3 (Truncated share) Let b−i = maxS∈P˜O|vi(Si)≤bi{vi(Si)} be the maximum share agent i
can obtain in any PO allocation in which she gets at most her budget-proportional share. Denote by
Sˆi = Sˆi(bi) the maximizing PO allocation, i.e., b−i = vi(Sˆii ).4 An allocation S gives agent i her truncated
budget-proportional share, or truncated share for short, if vi(Si) ≥ b−i .
An analogous definition is the following:
Definition 5.4 (Augmented share) Let b+i = minS∈P˜O|vi(Si)≥bi{vi(Si)} be the minimum share agent i
can obtain in any PO allocation in which she gets at least her budget-proportional share. Denote by
Sˇi = Sˇi(bi) the minimizing PO allocation, i.e., b+i = vi(Sˇii ). An allocation S gives agent i her augmented
share (and thus in particular her truncated share) if vi(Si) ≥ b+i .
The following lemma establishes a simple but important fact about the four allocations Sˆi, Sˆk, Sˇi, Sˇk,
which give agents i, k their truncated or augmented shares, respectively. Namely, it turns out that these
four allocations are in fact two, since Sˆi = Sˇk and Sˆk = Sˇi. By definition, each of these two allocations
gives each agent at least her truncated share.
4The allocation Sˆi(bi) is well-defined: it is possible to give nothing to agent i, so the maximum is taken over a non-empty
set of allocations. It is unique up to identical items.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the proof of Lemma 5.5.
Lemma 5.5 (Two “as fair as possible” allocations) Consider 2 agents i 6= k ∈ {1, 2} with additive
preferences and arbitrary budgets. Assume there are no budget-proportional allocations nor PO anti-
proportional allocations. Then the PO allocation Sˇi coincides with the PO allocation Sˆk. That is, Sˇi
obtains share b+i for agent i and share b
−
k for agent k.
Proof: Proof. Let k = 1, i = 2 (the complementary case k = 2, i = 1 is similar). Denote A = Sˇ1 and
B = Sˇ2. The notation we use for the proof is depicted in Figure 2, where indeed in allocation A agent 1
can be seen to receive value above b1, and in allocation B agent 2 can be seen to receive value above b2.
We now use Figure 2 to argue that B = Sˆ1 (showing that A = Sˆ2 is similar).
By assumption, the closure of the blue striped area (union of the areas to the right and above A and
B, with the area at or to the right of b1 and at or above b2) is empty of allocations except for A and B (the
same was established for Figure 1). By definition, B is the lowest PO allocation at or above b2. Any PO
allocation at or to the left of b1 that is to the right of B must be in the interior of the solid gray rectangle
X (using that there are no PO anti-proportional allocations, i.e., no PO allocations in the closure of the
dotted red area). Yet such a point in the interior of X is not only to the right of B, it is also below it.
This means that it is closer than B to b2 from above, yielding a contradiction.
The closed rectangle X must therefore be empty of PO allocations except for B (and thus must also be
empty of non-PO allocations). But the point corresponding to allocation Sˆ1 must fall within the closure
of rectangle X by definition (it is the rightmost PO point at or to the left of b1, and it cannot lie to the
left of B). Thus Sˆ1 = B, completing the proof.
The following example demonstrates that not every CE gives every agent her truncated share.
Example 5.1 (Less fair than possible) Consider 2 additive agents who both value items (A,B,C,D)
at (7.9, 1, 5, 2) (unnormalized). The budgets are b1 =
1
2 + , b2 =
1
2 −  for some sufficiently small . Every
allocation is PO. The allocation ({B,C,D}, {A}) is an equilibrium allocation in which agent 2 gets a
share of 7.915.9 < b2. The allocation ({A,B}, {C,D}) is also an equilibrium allocation, despite the fact that
agent 2’s share drops to 715.9 .
5
5The supporting prices for the two allocations are, respectively, p = ( 1
2
− , 1
6
, 1
6
, 1
6
+ ) and p = ( 1+
2
, 
2
, 1
4
, 1
4
− ).
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6 Main Technical Tool.
In this section we build our main technical tool for establishing generic existence of CEs for agents with
almost equal budgets (Section 7), and for agents with the same preferences and different budgets (Section
8). This tool is formalized in Lemma 6.3, which establishes two conditions that together are sufficient for
a CE to exist. Namely, for a fixed agent i, the conditions are:
1. Genericity of the budgets, defined as not belonging to a zero-measure subset Ri;
2. Emptiness of “rectangle” Ti from any allocations (see Figure 1).
The genericity condition is what drives our existence results, and is therefore to be expected. The condition
that Ti is empty, however, is a necessary artifact of our proof techniques.
6 Dropping this condition requires
novel ideas, and we leave this as an open question for future research.
6.1 Definitions.
We now formally define Ri, Ti. For the definition of Ti, recall the allocations Sˆi, Sˆk (Definition 5.3).
Definition 6.1 (Rectangle of allocations Ti) Let Ti = Ti(bi, v1, v2) be the set of allocations S satis-
fying vi(Sˆii ) < vi(Si) < vi(Sˆki ) and 0 < vk(Sk) < vk(Sˆkk ).
For the definition of Ri, let d = | P˜O | be the total number of PO allocations. Order all allocations in
P˜O by agent i’s preference, such that his r-th least preferred PO allocation is at index r ≤ d. Denote this
allocation by S(r), so that vi(S(r + 1)i) > vi(S(r)i) for every index r ≤ d− 1.
Definition 6.2 (Zero-measure subset of budgets Ri) Every budget pair (bi, 1− bi) for agents (i, k),
respectively, belongs to Ri = Ri(v1, v2) iff there exists an index r such that
bi
vi(S(r+1)i) =
1−bi
1−vi(S(r)i) .
Note that Ri is a zero-measure subset of the budget pairs.
6.2 Statement and proof.
Lemma 6.3 (Main technical tool.) Consider 2 agents with additive preferences v1, v2 and budgets
b1 > b2. Assume there are no budget-proportional allocations nor PO anti-proportional allocations. If
for some agent i, (b1, b2) /∈ Ri(v1, v2) and the set Ti = Ti(bi, v1, v2) is empty, then a CE exists. Moreover,
in this CE every agent gets his truncated share.
Proof: Proof. Let i be the agent for which the conditions of the lemma hold. By Lemma 5.5, both
PO allocations Sˇ1 and Sˇ2 give both agents their truncated share. To prove the claim it is thus sufficient
to show that at least one of these allocations is supported in a CE. We next show that indeed for some
γi ∈ (0, 1), at least one of these two allocations is supported by item prices of the form pj = γivi({j}) for
every item j.
We first characterize the set of allocations that are within the budget of each agent when prices are
set to pj = γivi({j}) for every item j, and γi ∈ (0, 1) (i.e., prices are a linearly scaled down version of
agent i’s valuation). Agent i can afford any allocation S such that γivi(Si) ≤ bi. Agent k can afford any
allocation S such that γivi(Sk) ≤ bk, or equivalently γi(1 − vi(Si)) ≤ 1 − bi (using that both valuations
and budgets are normalized, that is, b1 + b2 = v1(M) = v2(M)). We illustrate this for γi = 1 in Figure 3.
6Our simulations identified an example in which for each agent i, Ti is not empty, and there is
no CE with item prices based on scaling vi({j}) (other CEs were found). The example includes 7
items. Agent 1’s values are (0.1420, 0.0808, 0.1921, 0.1717, 0.1651, 0.1200, 0.1283), agent 2’s values are
(0.0827, 0.1056, 0.1743, 0.1515, 0.1862, 0.1123, 0.1874). The budgets are 0.8093 and 0.1907. [37] constructed a similar
example with 8 items in which there is no CE with combination pricing (other CEs were found).
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Figure 3: This figure illustrates the first part of the proof of Lemma 6.3, using the notation of Figure 1. It
shows the allocations that each agent can afford given his budget when prices are p = v1 (i.e., according
to agent 1’s valuation). Allocations in the solid yellow rectangle (at or to the left of b1) have value at
most b1 for agent 1, and thus also price at most b1, so agent 1 can afford them. Allocations in the solid
red rectangle (at or to the right of b1) have value at least b1 for agent 1, and thus agent 1 values agent 2’s
allocation at most at 1− b1 = b2 (by normalization), so the price is at most b2 and affordable for agent 2.
The blue striped area marks allocations with value for agent 1 that is above his value for B, and value
for agent 2 that is above his value for A. This area has no allocation at all, as it is subset of the union
of the following areas: the blue areas from Figure 1 without allocations below B and to the left of A; the
interiors of X and Y that are empty by the proof of Lemma 5.5 in Figure 2; and the interior of Z that
must be empty, as an allocation there must be dominated by some PO allocation in the areas we just
argued are empty, or by an anti-proportional PO allocation (which does not exist by assumption).
Therefore, if rectangle T1 is empty then at these prices agent 1 demands the allocation B = Sˇ2 (the
rightmost allocation within the yellow area – his budget), while agent 2 demands the allocation A = Sˇ1
(the highest allocation within the red area – his budget).
Now define
γi = max
{
bi
vi(Sˇii )
,
1− bi
1− vi(Sˇki )
}
= max
{
bi
b+i
,
bk
vi(Sˇkk )
}
< 1,
and note that γi is well-defined and less than 1. The assumption that the pair of budgets does not
belong to Ri(v1, v2) implies that the maximum is obtained by only one of the terms. The proof follows
by analyzing two cases, as illustrated in Figures 4 and 5, respectively:
• Case 1. γi = bi/b+i . We show that Sˇi is supported by item prices pj = γivi({j}). For agent i,
every allocation S = (Si,Sk) that he can afford satisfies vi(Si) ≤ bi/γi, and this holds with equality
for Sˇii . For agent k, every allocation S = (Si,Sk) that he can afford satisfies (bi/b+i )vi(Sk) ≤ 1− bi.
Since we are in the case that bi/b
+
i > (1− bi)/(1− vi(Sˇki )), we derive:
bi
b+i
(1− vi(Si)) = bi
b+i
vi(Sk) ≤ 1− bi < bi
b+i
(1− vi(Sˇki )),
or equivalently vi(Si) > vi(Sˇki ). We claim that agent k’s most preferred allocation that satisfies this
is Sˇi: By Lemma 5.5 it holds that Sˇi = Sˆk, i.e., Sˇi is also the PO allocation in which agent k gets
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Figure 4: This figure illustrates Case 1 in the proof of Lemma 6.3, using the notation of Figure 3, for agent
i = 1. Prices are pj = γ1v1({j}) for every item j, where γ1 = b1/b1+. The solid yellow and red rectangles
(at or to the left of A, and starting strictly to the left of b1 and stretching to the right, respectively) are
the allocations that agents 1 and 2 can afford, respectively. Both agents can afford more allocations than
when γi = 1 (cf. Figure 3). The overlap (depicted as an orange rectangle) contains the allocations that
both agents can afford.
The value of γ1 is such that agent 1 can exactly afford allocation A, which is clearly demanded by him
at these prices (the rightmost allocation within his budget). We show in the proof that agent 2 cannot
yet afford allocation B and any other allocation that gives him the same value, and so allocation A is in
his demand (the highest allocation within his budget, using that the blue striped area above A that is
within his budget, is empty). Thus (A, p) is a CE.
at most bk while maximizing his share. Since there is no allocation S in which vi(Si) > vi(Sˇki ) and
vk(Sk) > vk(Sˇik), the claim follows.
• Case 2. γi = bk/vi(Sˇkk ). We show that Sˇk is supported by item prices pj = γivi({j}). For agent k,
every allocation S = (Si,Sk) that he can afford satisfies vi(Sk) ≤ bk/γi, and this holds as equality
for Sˇkk . For agent i, every allocation S = (Si,Sk) that he can afford satisfies vi(Si) ≤ bi/γi <
bi
bi/vi(Sˇii )
= vi(Sˇii ), as bi/vi(Sˇii ) < 1−bi1−vi(Sˇki ) = γi. Since Ti is empty, it cannot be the case that
vi(Sˇki ) < vi(Si) < vi(Sˇii ). Thus the most preferred allocation that agent i can afford gives him at
most vi(Sˇki ). This is indeed what he gets in allocation Sˇk, thus Sˇki is demanded by agent i.
7 Equilibrium Existence for Almost Equal Budgets.
In this section we present our main result for almost equal budgets: the generic existence of a CE for 2
additive agents who are a priori equal. The genericity of the budgets serves as a tie-breaking mechanism
among the agents, and is sufficient to ensure CE existence for any number of items. The proof utilizes
Lemma 6.3.
Theorem 7.1 Consider 2 agents with additive preferences and budgets b1 > b2. For sufficiently small
 > 0, if b1 − b2 ≤  then there exists a CE that gives every agent his truncated share.
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Figure 5: This figure illustrates Case 2 in the proof of Lemma 6.3, using the notation of Figure 3, for
agent i = 1. Prices are pj = γ1v1({j}) for every item j where γ1 = b2/v1(Sˇ22 ). The solid yellow and
red rectangles (starting strictly to the right of b1 and stretching to the left, and at or to the right of B,
respectively) are the allocations that agents 1 and 2 can afford, respectively. Both agents can afford more
allocations than when γi = 1 (cf. Figure 3). The overlap (depicted as an orange rectangle) contains the
allocations that both agents can afford.
The value of γ1 is such that agent 2 can exactly afford allocation B, which is clearly demanded by him at
these prices (the highest allocation within his budget, using that the blue striped area is empty and that
B is PO). We show in the proof that agent 1 cannot yet afford allocation A, and so allocation B is in his
demand (the rightmost allocation within his budget, using the fact that within his budget, there are no
allocations that are also in the blue striped area right of B or in T1). Thus (B, p) is a CE.
Proof: Proof. Case 1. Assume first that there exists an allocation which gives each agent a value
of exactly 1/2. Then there is a PO allocation S that gives each agent at least 1/2. Such an allocation
is budget-proportional for b1 = b2 = 1/2, and thus by Proposition 5.1, there exists a CE (S, p). For
sufficiently small  > 0, let b1 = (
1
2 + )/(1 + ) >
1
2 and b2 = 1 − b1 (that is, we slightly increase the
budget of agent 1 while normalizing the sum b1 + b2 to 1). We claim that (S, p) is also a CE with the
perturbed budgets. Indeed, as prices have not changed, agent 2 gets his demand. As for agent 1, while
his budget is slightly larger, he cannot afford any set that is more expensive than his set S1, provided 
is smaller than the difference in prices of any two bundles with non-identical prices.
Case 2. Consider now the complementary case, in which no allocation gives each agent a value of
exactly 1/2. Case 2(a). If there is an allocation that gives both agents strictly more than 1/2, consider
any PO allocation that dominates it. For sufficiently small , the PO allocation is budget-proportional
for any budgets b1 > b2 ≥ b1 − , and so the result follows from Proposition 5.1. Note that if there is an
allocation that gives both agents strictly less than 1/2 then the allocation in which the two agents swap
their bundles gives both agents more than 1/2.
Case 2(b). From now on we assume that every allocation gives strictly more than 1/2 to one agent,
and strictly less than 1/2 to the other agent. For sufficiently small , such an allocation is neither budget-
proportional nor anti-proportional for any budgets b1 > b2 ≥ b1 − .
Recall from Definition 5.3 that Sˆ1(b1), Sˆ2(b2) are PO allocations that give agents 1, 2 their truncated
shares. As the set of PO allocations is finite, we can find  > 0 such that there is no PO allocation S such
that 1/2− 2 < v1(S1) < 1/2 + 2. For such an , consider budgets b1 > b2 ≥ b1 − . Using the notation
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Figure 6: Illustration of the proof of Theorem 7.1.
of Figure 2, let A = Sˆ2(b2) and B = Sˆ1(b1).
We first claim that A = Sˆ2(1/2) and B = Sˆ1(1/2). This holds because B is the PO allocation that
gives the largest value to agent 1 that is below 1/2− 2, but there are no PO allocations that give agent
1 value between 1/2− 2 and 1/2, and thus it also gives the largest value to agent 1 that is below 1/2. A
similar argument holds for A and the truncated share of agent 2.
Because every allocation gives strictly more than 1/2 to one agent and strictly less to the other,
v2(A2) < 1/2 =⇒ v1(A1) > 1/2, and v1(B1) < 1/2 =⇒ v2(B2) > 1/2.
We now show that A and B are “symmetric” in the sense that one is obtained from the other by
swapping bundles among the agents (and so v1(A1) = v1(B2) = 1 − v1(B1) and v2(A2) = 1 − v2(B2), as
can be seen in Figure 6). The proof of the symmetry claim is depicted in Figure 6, which also shows that
T1, T2 (as defined in Definition 6.1) are both empty. The budgets b1, b2 are almost equal, i.e., both are very
close to 1/2. For every allocation S there is a “symmetric” allocation S˜ obtained by swapping the allocated
bundles, which corresponds to a 180◦ rotation around the point (1/2, 1/2). Assume for contradiction that
A is not symmetric to B, that is B 6= A˜ = B′. Then it is also the case that A 6= B˜ = A′. Notice that
for sufficiently small , one of A′,B′ must be located in the interior of the axes-parallel rectangle Q as
illustrated in the figure. But since A = Sˆ2(b2) gives agent 2 his truncated share closest to b2 ≈ 1/2 from
below, A′ 6= A cannot be located as in the figure. Similarly, B′ 6= B cannot be located in the interior of Q
as in the figure, a contradiction. We have thus established that A,B are symmetric. We now show that
the closure of T1 must be empty, except for A: If that were not the case – say, T1 contained an allocation
C 6= A – then its symmetric allocation C˜ would Pareto dominate B (due to the symmetry of A,B), a
contradiction. T2 only contains the allocation B by a similar argument using the Pareto optimality of A.
We can set  to be sufficiently small such that (b1, b2) /∈ Ri(v1, v2). The proof is complete by invoking
Lemma 6.3.
8 Equilibrium Existence for Different Budgets.
Our techniques for almost-equal budgets apply directly to some cases of different budgets. In this section
we derive the generic existence of a CE for 2 additive agents with the same preferences, who can be a priori
non-equal (and in fact quite different) in their entitlement to the items. This is an indivisible version of
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the claims (bankruptcy) problem [46].
Theorem 8.1 Consider 2 agents with additive preferences and budgets b1 > b2, such that the pair (b1, b2)
does not belong to the zero-measure subset Ri (Def. 6.2) for some agent i. If the agents have the same
preferences then there exists a CE that gives every agent his truncated share.
When both agents share the same additive preferences, we have a “constant-sum game” – whatever
one agent gains the other loses. As a consequence, every allocation among such agents is PO, and in
addition there is no anti-proportional allocation, in which both agents would get at most their truncated
share and one of them strictly so. Theorem 8.1 thus follows directly from the next lemma, whose proof
utilizes Lemma 6.3:
Lemma 8.2 Consider 2 agents with additive preferences and budgets b1 > b2, such that the pair (b1, b2)
does not belong to the zero-measure subset Ri (Def. 6.2) for some agent i. If every allocation among the
agents is PO then there exists a CE. Moreover, if there is no anti-proportional PO allocation then this
CE gives each agent his truncated share.
Proof: Proof. If there exists a budget-proportional or anti-proportional PO allocation, then there
exists a CE by Proposition 5.1. In the former case, this CE clearly gives each agent his truncated share.
Otherwise, the conditions of Lemma 6.3 hold: any allocation in T1 would be dominated by Sˆ2, and any
allocation in T2 would be dominated by Sˆ1, but since there are no Pareto dominated allocations these
two rectangles must be empty. There thus exists a CE in which every agent gets at least his truncated
share, completing the proof.
9 Conclusions and Discussion.
9.1 Summary of contributions.
In this paper we aim to study the solution concept of CE from almost-equal budgets for markets with
indivisible items and additive preferences. We focus on simple markets with 2 agents. Even for such
markets, the classic solution concept of CEEI is not guaranteed to exist when the indivisibility of the
items prevents an allocation that gives each agent her proportional share. Our main result shows that a
CE from almost-equal budgets – i.e., equal budgets that are made generic by tiny random perturbations
– is guaranteed to exist. The main take-away is that generic almost-equal budgets is a new promising
approach for overcoming CE nonexistence. The existence results hinge on excluding degenerate market
instances, by adding small noise to the agents’ budgets to make them generic; this is in the spirit of
smoothed analysis for excluding hard instances to get computational tractability [59]. We leave as our
main open question whether it is possible to apply the approach of generic almost-equal budgets to more
than 2 agents.
A natural question – once budgets are non-equal – is which of the good efficiency and fairness properties
of CEEI are maintained by CEs from such budgets? It is not hard to see that CEs from (possibly very)
different budgets are still Pareto efficient (i.e., the first welfare theorem holds). As for fairness, we show
that CEs guarantee a new fairness notion: a natural generalization of the (n+1)-maximin-share guarantee
of Budish. The new notion strengthens the guarantee of Budish for almost-equal budgets, and applies
more broadly to arbitrary budgets. It holds in general for CEs with any number of agents and any
preferences.
In terms of techniques, our results are based on utilizing the agents’ additive preferences as the
starting point for equilibrium pricing. Our techniques also facilitate two additional results: One is the
second welfare theorem for 2 additive agents (complementing the first welfare theorem mentioned above).
The other is a CE existence result for 2 such agents with different budgets and identical preferences,
using the same method of budget perturbation. While we get a lot of mileage from using combinations of
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preferences for pricing, interestingly this method is insufficient when the 2 agents have arbitrary budgets
but non-identical preferences, and we leave this as another intriguing open problem.
9.2 Where to go from here.
Multiple agents. The case of 3 or more agents with almost-equal budgets is qualitatively more complex
than 2 agents due to the following simple observation: If an allocation and budget-exhausting pricing are
not a CE, then one of the agents wishes to dispose of a subset of her items, and to use the freed-up budget
to purchase an alternative bundle of items. When there are more than 2 agents, the alternative bundle can
be owned by multiple agents. This means that we cannot expect a characterization like Proposition 4.1 to
hold for more than 2 agents. In fact we can show that combination pricing is insufficient. This does not
mean of course that generic budgets are not useful for multiple agents with almost-equal budgets. One
encouraging signal comes from Spliddit instances, in which the preferences are additive and the budgets
equal. In all instances with more than 2 agents, after perturbing the budgets to make them almost
equal, a CE was found (see Appendix B). Note that an existence result for almost-equal budgets would
in particular solve an open problem originating with [54] (see also [39, Section 1.4]), and so we do not
expect it to be easy.
One setting in which generic budgets are insufficient to get existence is multiple agents with different
budgets. In recent work, Segal-Halevi [57] applies the method of generic budgets we suggest when the
number of agents is larger than 2 and the budgets are arbitrary (not almost-equal), and shows that for 4
agents with additive preferences, genericity of the budgets does not guarantee CE existence.
Fairness among non-equals. Fairness notions applicable to the allocation of indivisible items among
agents with different entitlements are an under-explored area of theory, despite many real-life applications
(e.g., allocating food items among foodbanks catering to different-sized populations [53]), and the increas-
ing importance of endowments as a policy tool (see, e.g., [29]). In this paper we develop some of the first
such notions, through a classic connection to competitive equilibrium. It is interesting to consider the
existence of fair allocations according to our notions independently from the existence of CEs. In particu-
lar, an allocation that guarantees every agent her `-out-of-d share is not necessarily a CE allocation, and
can be of independent interest as a solution concept. Another question is what is the appropriate notion
of envy-free fairness (as opposed to proportionality) for agents with different entitlements and indivisible
items? For a preliminary discussion on this topic, see Appendix A.
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A CE and Fairness.
A.1 Detailed fairness preliminaries.
The discussion in this section is summarized in Tables 1 and 2, which also show where our fairness concepts
fit in with some of the existing concepts.
A.1.1 Ordinal preferences.
An agent i ∈ N has an ordinal preference ≺i among bundles of items if S ≺i T for every T preferred
to S, and there is no representation of the preference via a numerical valuation function vi. Fair share
and envy-freeness are well-defined for ordinal preferences when items are divisible. Intuitively, fair share
guarantees that each agent believes he receives at least 1/n of the “cake” being divided, and envy-freeness
guarantees he believes no one else receives a better slice than him. More formally, fair share (FS) requires
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Table 1: Fair share and envy-free notions for ordinal preferences (our contribution in bold).
Equal budgets Arbitrary budgets
Divisible Fair share (FS) [60] Budget-FS
items Envy-freeness (EF) [32] Budget-EFa
Indivisible 1-out-of-n MMS [18] `-out-of-d MMS
items (Definition 2.5)
EF-1 [18], EF-1* [20] Justified-EF
(Definition A.7), open
aBudget-FS and budget-EF are natural generalizations of FS and EF, defined in Appendix A.1.
Table 2: Fair share notions for cardinal preferences (our contribution in bold).
Equal budgets Arbitrary budgets
Divisible items Proportionality [60] Budget-proportionality
[56, 13]
Indivisible items Proportionality [60] Truncated share
(Def. 5.3)
for each agent to receive a bundle that he prefers at least as much as the bundle consisting of a 1/n-fraction
of every item on the market. Agent i envies agent k given allocation S if Si ≺i Sk, and an allocation is
envy-free (EF) if no agent envies another agent.
We observe that for divisible items, both notions extend naturally to budgeted agents: Budget-FS
requires every agent to prefer his bundle at least as much as a bi-fraction of the bundle of all items. Agent
i envies agent k with a larger budget if he prefers a bi/bk-fraction of Sk to Si, and agent k
′ with a smaller
budget if he prefers Sk′ to a bk′/bi-fraction of Si; the budget-EF property excludes such envy.
When items are indivisible, FS is not well-defined; EF is well-defined but often cannot be satisfied [27].
To circumvent the definition and existence issues stemming from indivisibilities, Budish [18] proposes
appropriate variants: 1-out-of-n maximin share (Definition 2.5) and envy-free up to one good (Definition
A.3). Caragiannis et al. [20] introduce a strengthening of EF-1 called EF-1* (or EFX), envy-freeness up
to any good, in which for every agents i, k and any item j ∈ Sk it holds that Sk \ {j} ≺i Si.
We discuss how to generalize the maximin share guarantee for budgeted agents in Section 3, defining
the notion of `-out-of-d maximin share (Definition 2.5). We also define a notion called justified-EF for
budgets (Definition A.7), and leave the question of how to generalize (non-justified) EF to budgets as an
open direction.
Application to CEs. It is well-known that every CE with n equal budgets gives every agent his 1-
out-of-n maximin share and achieves EF. Budish [18] shows that every CE with almost equal budgets
guarantees 1-out-of-(n + 1) maximin share (whereas 1-out-of-n maximin share cannot always be guar-
anteed). Proposition 3.2 generalizes this to arbitrary budgets using the notion of `-out-of-d maximin
share.
Budish [18] also shows that every CE with almost equal budgets is EF-1 (a short proof appears for
completeness in Proposition A.4). We demonstrate that a CE with almost equal budgets is not necessarily
EF-1* (Claim A.6), but any CE with arbitrary budgets is justified-EF (Claim A.8).
A.1.2 Cardinal preferences.
For cardinal preferences, the parallel of FS is the notion of proportionality, which extends naturally to
agents with different budgets: Given a budget profile b, an allocation S gives agent i his budget-proportional
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share if agent i receives at least a bi-fraction of his value for all items, that is vi(Si) ≥ bi · vi(M). An
allocation is budget-proportional (a.k.a. weighted-proportional) if every agent receives his proportional
share. When all budgets are equal, such an allocation is simply called proportional. Budget-proportional
allocations play a central role in our positive results in Section 5. It is clear that a budget-proportional
allocation does not always exist with indivisible items (e.g., with a single one). In Section 5.2 we present
a relaxation of budget-proportional share that we call truncated share, which is guaranteed to exist
(Definition 5.3).
Budget-EF also extends naturally to agents with cardinal preferences and budgets, by saying that
agent i envies agent k if v(Si) < bi · vi(Sk)/bk. It is not hard to see that budget-EF implies budget-
proportionality. Another fairness notion for cardinal preferences which naturally extends to budgets
(e.g., [16]) is Nash social welfare maximization. Given a budget profile b, an allocation S is Nash social
welfare maximizing if it maximizes
∏
i(vi(Si))bi , or equivalently,
∑
i bi log vi(Si), among all allocations
(notice that the maximizer is invariant to budget or valuation scaling).
Application to CEs. In all settings for which we prove CE existence in Sections 7 and 8, the CEs
guarantee every agent his truncated share. A CE with equal budgets maximizes the (unweighted) Nash
social welfare; in contrast, we show a simple market with different budgets in which a CE exists, but the
allocation that maximizes Nash social welfare is not supported by a CE:
Claim A.1 There exists a market of 2 items and 2 agents with additive preferences and unequal budgets,
such that the unique PO allocation that maximizes (weighted) Nash social welfare is not supported in a
CE, but a CE exists.
Proof: Proof. Consider 2 agents Alice and Bob with budgets 101, 100, and 2 items A,B valued by Alice
v1(A) = 5, v1(B) = 4 and by Bob v2(A) = 1000, v2(B) = 1. Clearly the only CE gives item A to Alice and
item B to Bob (since Bob cannot prevent Alice from taking item A even if he pays his full budget for it),
but the only allocation maximizing the Nash social welfare (i.e., maximizing 101 log v1(S1)+100 log v2(S2))
gives item A to Bob and item B to Alice.
Claim A.2 There exists a market of 2 items and 2 agents with unequal budgets, for which a CE exists
and every CE allocation is anti-proportional.
Proof: Proof. Let b1 = 5/8, b2 = 3/8, v1(A) = 100, v1(B) = 101, v2(A) = 1, v2(B) = 1000. Since
b1 > b2, in every CE agent 1 gets his preferred item, item B. Moreover, he cannot get both items, as
b2 > b1/2 so agent 2 can always afford at least one item. So in every CE, agent 1 gets item B and agent 2
gets item A, and their shares are 100/201 < 5/8 and 1/1001 < 3/8, respectively. Equilibrium prices that
support this allocation are p(A) = 3/8, p(B) = 5/8.
A.2 Variants of envy-freeness.
In this section we discuss variants of envy-freeness, and define a notion called justified-EF for budgets
(Definition A.7). We leave the question of how to generalize (non-justified) EF to budgets as an open
direction.
Definition A.3 (EF with indivisibilities [18]) An allocation S is envy-free up to one good (EF-1) if
for every two agents i, k, for some item j ∈ Sk it holds that Sk \ {j} ≺i Si.
Budish [18] establishes an envy-free property of CEs with almost equal budgets, as follows (we include
a short proof for completeness):
Proposition A.4 (Budish [18]) Consider a CE (S, p) with almost equal budgets b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn ≥
m−1
m b1, then the CE allocation S is EF-1.
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Proof: Proof. Fix any two agents i, k. We show that there is some item j∗ ∈ Sk such that Si i Sk\{j∗}.
By Claim 2.2, we may assume without loss of generality that the budget of agent k is exhausted. So there
exists some item j∗ ∈ Sk such that its price pj∗ is at least bk/|Sk| ≥ bk/m. The price of Sk \ {j∗} is
therefore at most m−1m bk ≤ bn ≤ bi, and so i can afford Sk \ {j∗}. Since S is a CE allocation and bundle
Sk \ {j∗} is within i’s budget, Si i Sk \ {j∗} as needed.
A requirement stronger than (implying) EF-1 and weaker than (implied by) EF is the following:
Definition A.5 (Caragiannis et al. [20], Definition 4.4) An allocation S is EF-1* if for every two
agents i and k, for every item j ∈ Sk it holds that Sk \ {j} ≺i Si.
An EF-1* allocation always exists for 2 agents – the cut-and-choose procedure from cake-cutting
results in such an allocation. It is an open question whether it always exists in general. We demonstrate
(by an example with non-strict preferences) that an EF-1* allocation is not necessarily EF even when an
EF allocation exists in the market:
Example A.1 Consider 3 symmetric additive agents, 22 “small” items worth 1 each, and 2 “large” items
worth 7 each. An EF allocation is two bundles of 1 large item and 5 small items each, and one bundle of
12 small items. An EF-1* allocation that is not EF is one bundle of 2 large items, and two bundles of 11
small items each.
While Proposition A.4 shows that a CE implies EF-1 for almost equal budgets, we next prove that a
CE does not imply the stronger property EF-1*.
Claim A.6 The allocation of a CE from almost equal budgets is not necessarily EF-1*, even for 2 sym-
metric agents with an additive preference over 4 items.
Proof: Proof. The proof follows from Example 5.1. Recall that the allocation ({A,B}, {C,D}) is a CE
allocation, but it is not EF-1*: agent 2 envies agent 1 even if he gives up item B.
We conclude this section by defining a notion of envy-freeness that a CE with different budgets
guarantees. Borrowing from the matching literature, we define justified envy as the envy of an agent with
a higher budget towards an agent with a lower budget. The intuition is that any envy of a lower-budget
agent towards the allocation of a higher-budget agent isn’t justified and so “doesn’t count”, because the
higher-budget agent “deserves” a better allocation. We thus only care about eliminating justified envy.
Definition A.7 An allocation S is justified-EF given budgets b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bn if for every two agents
i < k, agent i (with the higher budget) does not envy agent k (with the lower budget). An allocation S
is justified-EF for coalitions if for every agent i and set of agents K such that i /∈ K and bi ≥
∑
k∈K bk,
agent i does not envy K, i.e.,
⋃
k∈K Sk ≺i Si.
Claim A.8 Every CE allocation (with possibly very different budgets) is justified-EF for coalitions.
Proof: Proof. Assume that bi ≥
∑
k∈K bk. Since the total price
∑
k∈K p(Sk) is at most
∑
k∈K bk, agent i
can afford the bundle
⋃
k∈K Sk. Because S is a CE allocation, it must hold that
⋃
k∈K Sk ≺i Si.
A.3 Relation to Nash social welfare.
The first step towards establishing the existence of a market equilibrium is identifying a PO allocation
which, given the budgets, can be supported by appropriate prices in a CE. One natural candidate is the
PO allocation that maximizes Nash social welfare – and thus also enjoys certain fairness properties. The
next example rules out this approach, by demonstrating the existence of a market with a CE in which
the unique PO allocation that maximizes Nash social welfare cannot be supported by prices.
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Example A.2 Consider 2 agents who value 2 items A,B as follows: v1(A) = 8, v1(B) = 4, v2(A) = 1024,
v2(B) = 1. The budgets are 100 + , 100 where 0 <  ≤ 1. The unique CE allocates item A to agent 1 and
item B to agent 2, since agent 2 cannot prevent agent 1 from demanding item A – not even by paying
full budget for it.
The only allocation maximizing the Nash social welfare (100 + ) log v1(S1) + 100 log v2(S2) gives item
A to agent 2 and item B to agent 1.
B Computerized Search for Equilibrium.
We attempted to find a market with no CEs for additive as well as general preferences. The instances
examined were either randomly generated by sampling from distributions, or taken from real-world Splid-
dit data. The computational results suggest that CE existence is a wider phenomenon than theoretically
verified at this point.
B.1 Two agents with randomly sampled preferences.
Setup. Our computerized search ran on instances with between 4 and 8 items and 2 agents with ran-
domly generated preferences.7 We generated both random additive preferences, where the values for
the items were drawn from the uniform or Pareto distributions and then normalized to sum up to 1,
as well as random general monotone preferences. To generate the monotone preferences we randomly
picked an order for all singletons, then randomly placed all pairs among the singletons while maintaining
monotonicity, then placed all triplets and so on.
In choosing budgets for the random additive instances, our goal was to avoid instances for which we
know from Lemma 6.3 or from our companion paper that a CE exists. We thus iterated over consecutive
pairs of allocations on the Pareto optimal frontier, and for each such pair tested several budgets that
“crossed” in between those allocations. To illustrate this, recall Figure 2 in which the budgets “cross”
between A and B. This choice ruled out the existence of budget-proportional allocations. We used
additional such considerations to carefully chose the budgets in order to rule out all “easy cases”. For
random non-additive instances, we simply used several choices of arbitrary non-equal budgets.
Running the search. For each of the resulting instances we conducted an exhaustive search for an
equilibrium: we iterated over all possible PO allocations, and for each one of them we used CVX with
the LP solver MOSEK 7 to look for equilibrium prices. Note that although the problem is possibly
computationally hard, our instances were small enough that they could be completely solved by the
solver in a matter of seconds. We verified the equilibria found by the LP solver by implementing a
demand oracle. The run time for 10,000 instances of 4 items was several minutes, and run time increased
noticeably as the number of items increased.
In all instances with additive preferences that we tested, we found and verified an equilibrium. As for
general preferences, in all cases with 4 items we found an equilibrium (as expected), and even for 5 items
we needed to go over several hundred instances before we found one that does not have an equilibrium.
Instances with general preferences that do not have an equilibrium seemed to become more rare as the
number of items increased.
B.2 Spliddit data with additive preferences.
Setup. We ran our second computerized search on instances of Spliddit data, specifically, 803 instances
created so far through Spliddit’s “Divide Goods” application that were kindly provided to us by the
Spliddit team [cf. 20, Sec. 4.3]. In every Spliddit instance, every agent divides a pool of 1000 points among
7The instances with 4 items were generated as a “sanity check”, as we know from our companion paper that a CE exists
for these instances.
28
the instance’s indivisible items in order to indicate his values for the items; the resulting preference is
additive in these values.
Running the search. We implemented a simple taˆtonnement process: Prices start at 0, and all agents
are asked for their demand at these prices. Then the price of over-demanded items is increased by 1, and
the price of undemanded items is decreased by 1. Prices thus remain integral throughout the process, and
since our budgets are reasonably-sized integers the process is likely to converge reasonably quickly (we do
not allow it to run for more than 20, 000 iterations). The running time was typically well under a minute,
usually no more than a second or two. One issue that deserves mention (and possibly further research) is
how to update the prices when more than a single item is over- or under-demanded. Our first attempts
either updated only a single such item’s price in every iteration, or updated all such items’ prices – both
variants converged to a CE fairly often. We improved upon this by randomly deciding after each price
update whether or not to continue updating prices in the current iteration.
Special case of interest. An anecdotal but interesting case is non-demo instances with between 5 and
10 items. There were 14 such instances available in the data, with between 3 and 9 agents each. As
Spliddit assumes that agents have equal entitlements, we started by giving all agents equal budgets of
100, in which case an equilibrium was found for less than half of the instances. When we added small
perturbations to make the budgets only almost equal (resulting in the budget vector (100, 103, 106, . . . )),
we found a CE in all instances. The same was true for other small perturbations that we tried (resulting
in budget vectors like (100, 101, 104, 109, . . . )). We also tried several other budget vectors with budgets
that are far from equal (such as (100, 151, 202, . . . ) or (100, 200, 300, . . . )), and CEs were found for these
as well.
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